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SY ADLER

The Evolution of Federal Transit Policy

first major piece of national transit legislation was enacted in 1964.
1969 the Urban Ma~s Transportation Administration was the subject
a highly critical analysis by staff investigators for a Congressional Appro.
Committee, and in the early 1970s industry analysts sharply
the rationality of urban transit policy in general. In 1981 the
General of the U.S. reported to Congress that the demand
transit subsidies was approaching crisis proportions. I The U. S. governhas come to playa greater role in the transit industry than do most
counterparts, provides more passenger subsidy per ride than any
country, and, though transit is everywhere subsidized, the U.S.
government subsidizes a greater share of industry costs than most
national governments. l This article examines the circumstances
which this particular industry-government relationship developed.
part of this industrial policy discussion, the article also looks at the
ture of discourse that was present during the early intervention period
that has been characteristic of the transit policy community since
at time. 3
David Jones argues that the federal program failed to address the undering causes of the widespread financial distress of the urban transit indusduring the post":"Worid War II period, a reflection of the fact that
irtually no attention was given to the economics of transit operations. "
e critiques federal government intervention on the grounds that "policy
s being built for and around the racehorses, not the workhorses, of the
nsit industry," by which he means that policy focused on the suburb-tontral city journey rather than on the intra-urban travel that was the
ead and butter of city transit properties. Moreover, he claims that the
URNAL OF POLICY HISTORY, Vol. 5, No. I, 1993.
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federal bureaucracy charged with administering the transit program consistently deferred to local priorities and judgments. 4
This article argues that transit policy was indeed captured-at the
outset-by central business district activists in cities across the country
seeking to enhance the locational advantages of their place in the face of
increasingly intense competition from suburban business centers. The
mayor of Atlanta, testifying to a congressional committee in 1961 on
behalf of the American Municipal Association and the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, precisely articulated the theme that Jones pinpoints as leading
to policy failure : "The greatest dilemma is this. Mass transportation has
failed to keep pace with the explosive growth of our suburban areas . . ..
Our mass transportation facilities must be stretched out into these new
suburban areas. . . . Most of the strangling congestion on our central city
streets results from the fact that private operators find it unprofitable to
expand their services into the less densely populated suburban areas. It is a
vital public necessity that such service be provided . . . . If they are vital
public necessities, yet unprofitable to operate privately, they must be
subsidized. "5
The central city focus of the federal program reflected a strategic shift
by transit advocates in congressional policy-making tactics, away from the
commuter railroad problems of a few big metropolitan areas-and the
jurisdiction of the congressional commerce committees that dealt with
railroad transportation matters-toward a broader concern with urban
transportation and related land-use issues. The constituency for intervention was broadened, and the issues were addressed by the more interventionist and city-oriented banking and currency committees. However,
shortly after the legislative breakthrough in 1964, the transit program and
its implementing bureaucracy were moved to the newly established Department of Transportation, rather than being permanently lodged with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Although it was
not especially controversial at the time, the shift institutionalized a set of
conflicts between Transportation's continuing efforts to rationalize the
supply of transit facilities and deeply rooted congressional efforts to subsidize the competitive exertions of central city constituents.
These conflicts, whether expressed on the terrain of land use or of
transport supply, were present in the original debates regarding the nature
and purposes of transit policy, and reflected a growing executive branch
concern with rationalizing the national government's myriad interventions in these spheres. 6 This rationalizing concern, which characterized
both Republican and Democratic administrations and grew in intensity as
congresionally driven program subsidies escalated, is one of the key dimen-
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sions of transit industrial policy analyzed below. However, before turning
to a discussion of the dynamics of intervention, the article first grounds
the evolution of federal policy in the context of local responses to the
decline of the mostly privately owned transit industry during the 1940s
and 1950s.

Responding to Industry Decline
As the financial and service problems of urban transit worsened in the
post-World War II period, industry leaders advocated several steps to
restore profitable operations and to prevent government takeovers of private properties. However, as the limits of these responses became increasingly evident to central city business and to political and technical activists, and as competition between central business districts and growing
outlying business centers intensified, downtown interests sought to create
regionwide governmental transit agencies that would invest in the types
of services and facilities that would enhance the accessibility and reception capacity of the core. Represen'tatives of outlying business centers
resisted these initiatives, which produced governmental transit agencies
with limited capabilities. These local political constraints, combined with
state legislative reluctance to subsidize urban projects, reinforced a tum by
downtown activists to the federal government.
In order to reverse the declining fortunes of their industry, leaders
exhorted transit firms to pursue several different strategies. These ideas
were Widely discussed in the industry press and successes were loudly
trumpeted to encourage others to adopt the innovations. First and foremost, transit properties were advised to establish and maintain close working alliances with downtown merchants and property owners, major newspapers, and city political officials. The key to these alliances, according to
their industry leadership, was an awareness of shared fate. The financial
future of all the alliance partners was intimately related to the health of
the downtown economy, and transit operators had to convince these
others that a thriving central business district required a viable transit
system. 7
Solid working relationships would, in tum, facilitate the adoption of
various street and parking management tactics that would expedite the
flow of surface transit vehicles, thereby improving the efficiency of operations. These included the elimination of on-street parking in the downt~wn area during the day or at least during peak periods, the provision of
fnnge parking/shuttle bus service, controls on turning movements, and
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the radical notion of reserving traffic lanes on the main downtown routes
exclusively for transit vehicles during rush hours. New Orleans and Chicago set up fringe lots in the late 1940s. Philadelphia banned on-street
parking downtown during the 1952 Christmas shopping season, and later
generalized the practice, following a suggestion made by the major transit
company there, and in early 1956 Nashville set up the first traffic lane
reserved exclusively for buses. s Nashville's mayor Ben West, who was also
a leading activist in the American Municipal Association during the
1950s, was hailed as a hero by the industry. The editors of Mass Transportation wrote in their report on the 1956 American Transit Association
convention that "the best speech ... was given by Mayor Ben West of
Nashville, Tennessee. But we had the feeling that there was not complete
realization by transit men that here, in the person of this energetic mayor
and in the things that have been accomplished in Nashville, was everything transit seeks in the way of city operation."9
Transit industry leaders also hoped that an alliance with downtown
interests would lead to support for a set of long-sought changes in the
regulatory environment within which privately owned firms operated,
and in fare practices. These were aimed at reducing costs, boosting productivity, and enhancing revenues. The industry sought emancipation from
what were perceived to be oppressive franchise taxes and gross revenue
levies; rigid rate structures, which made it impossible to raise and lower
fares in a timely manner; and severe constraints on operators' capacity to
drop service on unprofitable lines. Houston, for example, lowered gross
receipts taxes in 1952, and the press kept a scoreboard of reductions in
various taxes and forms of regulatory relief granted by states and cities
around the country. 10
On the revenue side, industry leaders called for the introduction of
distance-based or zonal fare structures and peak period pricing. Industry
analysts noted that while off-peak riding was precipitously declining,
peak-priced ridership was holding its own. Moreover, the postwar round
of fare increases was driving away the short-haul passenger. In early 1956
Toledo instituted a downtown free fare zone as part of a zone fare system,
and the St. Louis transit company reduced off-peak fares for downtown
trips during shopping hours and also worked out a deal with downtown
merchants to subsidize shopper travel. II
While the transit industry promoted these institutional, fare, and traffic
management changes, their alliance partners representing downtown
sought a variety of service innovations in return for their support. These
had mostly to do, as the Atlanta mayor told the Congress in 1961, with
extending service to rapidly developing suburban areas, and providing
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peak-period express service between these outlying areas and the central
business district. These were the sorts of services that investors rooted in
downtown sought to deploy in order to counter the competitive threat
posed by suburban business centers and their acres of free parking. These
were, however, the most costly services for the transit industry-already
reeling from the financially devastating effects of the peaking problemto supply. IZ
The St. Louis Public Service Company, the major transit supplier in
that city, was widely regarded as "The Showpiece of the Transit Industry,"
largely because of the property's heroic efforts to respond, on behalf of
downtown, to the suburban challenge. The company instituted a number
of peak-period express bus routes between outlying areas and the core and
ran shopper expresses as well. It utilized park-and-ride lots in suburban
areas and fielded the nation's largest fleet of air-conditioned buses. The
company president lobbied incessantly for exclusive bus lanes on the
downtown streets, as had been introduced in Nashville. Nashville Transit
initiated De Luxe commuter service using a subscription bus approach in
early 1955, as did the Cincinnati operation, and the Washington, D.C. ,
transit firm proposed to offer subscription-type club express service. These
were aimed at attracting the long-distance traveler. I3
While there was some movement in the direction of these sorts of peak
period, long-distance express services, privately owned firms generally
resisted downtown pleas to increase significantly their offerings in this
area. Pacific Electric Railway in Los Angeles, which had resumed a limited number of express runs in 1946 that had been suspended during the
war explained that "express service during the peak hours of travel has
stimulated such peak hour travel without any appreciable effect on the
mid-day or off-peak travel. It is a well known fact that all peak-hour
travel, while undoubtedly of material benefit to the community served
and to the passengers using it, has had a detrimental effect upon the
earnings of the Company. "14 While deteriorating financial circumstances
sharply constrained the capacity of private firms to provide these sorts of
services, the few city-owned transit systems in the country were checked
by municipal boundaries. The San Francisco Municipal Railway, for example, inaugurated express services from outlying parts of the city and put
buses on freeways as quickly as segments opened to traffic, but Muni could
not penetrate the rapidly growing sections of the peninsula south of the
City or extend into the eastern or northern parts of the bay region. 15
As a result of the financial exhaustion of the private companies and the
limits of city-based public alternatives, downtown activists initiated movements to create regionwide governmental transit agencies with the politi-

74

JOURNAL OF POLICY HISTORY

cal and financial power to provide the kinds of facilities and services that
were seen as crucial to the survival of the central business district. These
same activists were also in the forefront of the drive to launch a massive
freeway building program that would include urban extensions of the
interstate system. Nashville mayor Ben West, hero of the transit industry,
was also the chair of the American Municipal Association's Highways
Committee. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Public Works Committee
in 1955 about the national highway program, he articulated the cities'
interest in metropolitan freeways and explained that a large-scale federal
program was necessary because of rural domination of state legislatures.
"We are going to be lost balls in the high weeds," he said, "because we
cannot get enough money [from the states] to take care of that tremendous load of cost of acquisition of rights-of-way. "1 6
Downtown activists sought transport facilities that would radiate from
the core into outlying areas. Combining freeway and transit facili ties
within the same right-of-way-a set of downtown/radial corridors-was
their ideal configuration. Such transport facilities would enable people to
make increasingly lengthy, metropolitan-scale trips quickly, and, together
with parking lots, would supply the central business district with virtually
unlimited reception capacity. The idea surfaced in Detroit in a 1920s
report by a group of five prominent businessmen calling for the construction of a network of "superhighways" that would incorporate transit in the
median strip. Rail transit in freeway medians was the objective of a Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce-led movement in that region in the late
1940s, and the first such facility in the U. S., a rail line in the median strip
of the Congress Street Expressway in Chicago, opened in 1958. 17 However, creating the governmental capacities that were necessary to finance
such multimodal corridor projects, as well as separate transit facilities, was
quite difficult politically.
California central business districts experienced the full force of suburban competition more intensely than elsewhere during the early postwar
period. Efforts to create regional transit agencies in three California urban
areas during the 1940s and 1950s reveal the political conflicts that attended these downtown responses. These conflicts would shortly characterize other metropolitan areas as well. When the Los Angeles Chamber
of Commerce launched its drive to create a rapid transit district that
would place rail lines in several downtown/radial freeways-which the
Chamber had played a leading role in winning-opposition surfaced in
the large number of outlying business centers, within as well as without
the city, to the new governmental entity. The basis of resistance was
straightforward, reflecting the fundamental way in which the intense
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competition between business centers in the region to maintain and attract mobile capital investment structured the dynamics of transport politics: outlying business center representatives opposed subsidizing transport
projects that would primarily benefit the Los Angeles central business
district. 18
The intense political conflict surrounding the downtown-oriented transit initiative produced, in 1951, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit
Authority, which so clearly reflected the stalemate that prevailed in the
region that it was thoroughly paralyzed for several years. In 1957 this
regional government agency was finally enabled to buyout the private
firms, but was too financially and politically constrained to implement
much of the key elements of the downtown program. 19
A downtown San Francisco-led rapid transit movement emerged shortly
after its Los Angeles counterpart, which eventually succeeded in building
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. However, the same conflicts
that characterized the Los Angeles experience surfaced in the Bay region,
nearly derailing the project there as well. In the end, a much smaller system
than transit activists originally conceived was built. During the early years
of the transit movement in the Bay Area, the main line of conflict separated downtown activists in San Francisco and Oakland, with the Oakland
leadership perceiving the San Francisco proposal as yet another attempt by
its larger competitor to defend the historic pattern of regional domination
and prevent downtown Oakland from playing the hegemonic officecommercial role in the rapidly growing East Bay portion of the region. The
Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission was created in 1951, during the same
legislative session as its Los Angeles analogue, and was equally as constrained. During the next few years, however, San Francisco and Oakland
activists reached an accommodation-built around an underwater transbay tube-that promised to permit both downtowns jointly to penetrate
rapidly growing suburban areas.
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District, created in 1957, reflected the San
FranCisco-Oakland settlement; however, the growth of several business
centers on the peninsula south of San Francisco during the 1950s led to
another rupture. Santa Clara County, which contains San Jose, refused to
join the District, and San Mateo County, immediately south of the city,
Withdrew from the District a few years later. Financing for a much truncated three-county system, rather than the six-county network sought by
San Francisco activists, was approved by the district electorate in 1962,
and limits on the district's bonding capacity further constrained system
deSign and construction. 20
Their efforts earned BART district activists a hero's welcome at congres-
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sional hearings, though. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jer ey, the
leading transit advocate in Congress, praised district representatives for
doing "what in many areas has seemed almost impossible, to get the whole
region, or most of the region, into a governing unit ... each jealous, of
course, of its own sovereignty, and have done an even harder job of giving
them the power to raise the money." Following successful passage of the
BART bond issue, Williams described it as "a governmental miracle that
your people . . . voted to tax themselves for this magnificent proposed
rapid transit line. " 21
While the downtown Oakland leadership struggled with San Francisco
over a regional rapid transit system, they faced their own local crisis.
Oakland and several other smaller cities in the East Bay were served by Key
System Transit Lines, one of the handful of big-city transit properties-St.
Louis Public Service was another-controlled by National City Lines
(NCL). NCL sought to maintain the profitability of its transit empire in
large part through an effort to hold down wages, a strategy that produced a
great deal of bitterness on the part of the unionized workers who toiled on
its properties, particularly in the many smaller cities where NCL's wage
discipline was especially strict. The Amalgamated Association of Street,
Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of America, which represented most NCL workers, also deeply resented the company's policy of
refusing to submit contract disputes to arbitration. As NCL sought to hold
the line on wages during the protracted period of industry decline, strikes
on NCL properties increased in frequency, and the co'mpany was quite
willing to take lengthy strikes in order to enforce its bargaining position.
The downtown Oakland leadership had to stand idly by while a Key
System refusal to arbitrate provoked a seventeen-day strike in 1947 and a
strike lasting two and a half months in 1953, severely affecting downtown
business and retail sales. The latter strike was widely interpreted as an
NCL effort to force a government buy-out of the property; the archconservative Oakland leadership reluctantly moved to comply. Blessed by
Joseph Knowland, publisher of the Oakland Tribune and a leading activist
in the right wing of the state and national Republican party, a coalition of
downtown business, political and technical people sponsored the creation
of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, to take over Key System
and provide transit service that would strengthen downtown Oakland's
position in the East Bay. Key System had always staunchly resisted extending lines into growing areas and providing express services to the core.
Knowland explained to his associates: "I am not an advocate of public
ownership, as such. But we are here confronted with a condition, not a
theory. "
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The Oakland-centered regional transit government that Knowland and
colleagues created was endowed with the broadest range of political and
financial power of any such entity created before federal governmental
intervention. The district was the only one in the country with an elected
board of directors and unlimited power to tax property within its jurisdiction, and it was granted a larger proportional bonding capacity than was
its larger Bay Area counterpart. However, even the powerful downtown
Oakland coalition was constrained in its drive to encompass the entire
East Bay region within its district's domain. Substantial portions of both
Alameda and Contra Costa counties successfully resisted incorporation
into the transit district, seeking instead to foster the growth aspirations of
their own business centers. 22
Similar competition-driven dynamics w~re in evidence elsewhere in the
country as well. The Manhattan-centered plan of the New York-New
Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission drew the same kind of fire
as in the Los Angeles and San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan areas.
Business and political leaders in the larger New Jersey cities attacked the
understanding that informed the commission's rail transit plan-that the
metropolitan area constituted a single, integrated social and economic
unit focused on the Manhattan central business district-and resisted the
creation of a region-wide government agency that would impose the commission's plan on them. Z3 Efforts to create a Baltimore-centered metropolitan transit authority were similarly stymied for several years during the
1950s, and the Chicago Transit Authority repeatedly failed to secure the
capacity to implement major extension programs. 24 In Washington,
D.C., the House District of Columbia Committee decided that approval
should be sought for only that portion of a proposed rail rapid transit
system for the national capital region that was mainly within the District
of Columbia due to serious suburban uncertainties regarding the location
of the proposed rail lines. 25
In mid-1961, just as the drive for federal intervention in transit was
gathering steam, the trade journal Metropolitan Transportation surveyed
the thirteen major regional transport agencies then functioning, including the New York City Transit Authority. All of these were constrained
in various jurisdictional and/or financial ways from fully implementing the
downtown corridor program, and in many other areas local conflicts had
prevented the emergence of regional agencies at all. 26 The transit districts
and authorities, such as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority,
instituted as much long-distance, peak-period express service as they
could. However, a combination of political conflict at the metropolitan
level and state-level unwillingness to subsidize urban transport projects
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limited the capacities of the new agencies to act. City support for federal
intervention, for both downtown/radial freeways and transit, increased in
relation to these political obstacles.

The Dynamics of Federal Intervention
Downtown activists were supported in their natural legislative effort by
some commuter railroads, the Railway Progress Institute representing rail
equipment manufacturers, and the Institute for Rapid Transit, which
included rail transit operators, equipment manufacturers, and transport
planning and engineering consulting firms. They were championed by a
growing number of congressional representatives who sought to advance
the interests of their constituents. However, this alliance confronted a
tentative executive branch. Tentativeness was a product of two contradictory sets of pressures bearing on top officials of both political parties and
their executive appointees. On the one hand, national leaders of both
parties sought to use metropolitan programs, including transit, to solidify
relationships between national and local party organizations and to enhance the party's electoral appeal among target groups at the local level.
The Democrats used urban programs aimed at traditional big-city strongholds in the Northeast, Midwest, and West during the Kennedy-Johnson
years, and the Republicans adopted their own version aimed at suburban
voters and the newer cities of the South, Southwest and Western areas
during the Nixon period.
Executive branch officials, however, were also concerned about rationalizing the national government's growing involvement with metropolitan area problems. They worried about the budgetary impacts of the
increasing amounts of subsidy, the extent to which the many programs
were effectively coordinated, and the efficiency with which program objectives were addressed. Party-building and electoral concerns, along with
congressional advocacy, have produced periodic transit program expansion. Rationalization efforts have sought continually to rein in subsidy
commitments and discipline the allocation process according to efficiency
objectives. Both tendencies are responses to the competition between
places to maintain and attract mobile capital investment at the local
level. Spatial competition engenders a continuing demand for transport
projects that will create and maintain location advantages; executives
continually search for ways to contain the fiscal crisis tendencies inherent
in the growing number of project proposals.
The kinds of transit initiatives that downtown activists sought from the
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federal government to overcome their political and financial obstacles fell
into three main categories; (1) institutional and financial access to interstate highway rights-of-way in order to realize fully the promise of the
downtown/radial transport corridor; (2) grants to construct radial rapidtransit facilities-for rail and bus rapid transit, both inside freeways and
separately-that would penetrate rapidly growing suburban areas; and (3)
subsidies for equipment and labor to operate the new peak-period services.
It took varying lengths of time to achieve these objectives. Institutional
commitments at the national level were fairly easily secured. Subsidies for
equipment preceded major support for construction and right-of-way acquisition, and operating subsidies were the most difficult to accomplish.
By the mid-1970s, though, all the elements were in place.
City officials, local transit activists, and congressional advocates began
calling for access to freeways during debates on the national highway
program in the mid-1950s. The American Municipal Association resolved at its annual convention in 1957 that the federal Bureau of Public
Roads should authorize plans and specifications for the inclusion of transit
facilities as an eligible federal cost in the planning of the urban segments
of the new interstates. The idea was also boosted by Harland Bartholomew, one of the nation's leading urban planners and the chairman of the
National Capital Planning Commission. He said in 1957 that he would
ask District of Columbia highway officials to reserve the median strips of
two proposed highways for mass transit, and the proposed transportation
plan released by the Bartholomew Commission in 1959 called for extensive bus and rail use of freeway rights-of-way and lanes as well. 27
As part of the Kennedy administration's response to the downtown
coalition's transit initiative, the president called for a report on the nation's mass-transit problems and needs to be jointly prepared by the Housing and Home Finance Agency and the Department of Commerce. This
1962 report concluded that "the Bureau of Public Roads will in the future
(a) permit the reservation of highway lanes for the exclusive use of specific types of motor vehicles when comprehensive transportation plans
indicate this to be desirable, and (b) encourage the development of rail
transit and highway facilities in the same right-of-way whenever more
effective transportation will result. "28 In his transportation message to the
Congress, presented shortly after receipt of the report, President Kennedy
said that he had endorsed the recommendations, and during congressional
testimony the federal highway administrator said that the Bureau of Pubhc Roads was implementing what the President had approved, referring
speCifically to the charge given designers of the congressionally authorized
Shirley Highway in the Washington, D.C., area to consider the inclusion
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of special bus lanes. The administrator also, however, called attention to
the fact that funds to implement the transit portion of any joint use plan
were not yet generally available. 29
Walter McCarter, a former Chicago transit official and now president
of the Institute for Rapid Transit recalled at congressional hearings in
1963 that he had worked closely with former Bureau of Public Roads chief
Tom McDonald in the late 1940s on planning the jointly used Congress
Street Expressway, and that McDonald had told him at the time that "If
he had had the power ... he would not have allowed an expressway to be
built in any metropolitan area without a median strip wide enough for a
private right-of-way [for mass] transportation. He did not have the power
at that time. " 30 The mayor of Seattle, representing the American Municipal Association, also called on Congress to provide funds for advance
right-of-way acquisition so that space might be reserved for transit. 31
The first major piece of transit legislation, in 1964, made available
federal grants for land acquisition, new equipment purchase, and facility
construction. Money for land would enable local transit agencies to begin
implementing their share of corridor development. Funds for equipment
would permit locals to modernize and upgrade their vehicles and facilities.
This element also amounted to a protectionist industrial adjustment policy aimed at stabilizing the rail equipment manufacturers who were prominent members of the transit coalition, and who stressed to Congress the
dispersed character of their industry-plants in 468 cities in all but three
continental states-and the likelihood of hiring back many of their workers who had been laid off in 1961. 32 Construction grants would help to
underwrite radial projects aimed at penetrating rapidly growing suburban
areas. However, the amounts of money involved were modest. This reflected the still rather narrow basis of support for a program of transit
intervention, which was concentrated among those urban areas where
downtown already confronted suburban competition, and where existing
private and public transit firms were clearly unable to help the central
business district compete.
The next major expansion of the transit program was in 1970, as
national Republicans deployed a metropolitan strategy aimed at newer
cities in the South, Southwest, and West whose core areas were noW
beginning to feel the same sorts of competitive pressures as earlier had the
older urban centers, and whose transit firms were now similarly fin ancially
exhausted. A lobbyist for the transit coalition noted that "now we have
new horizon cities-younger and more expansive metropolitan areas in
all sections of the country- wanting to build rapid rail systems to their
suburbs. . . . In the next 20 years, all the new systems now on the
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drawing boards will be aimed at that 10 per cent of the SMSA ...
populations made up of commuter riders. "33 Republicans and southerners
were attracted to a program aimed at suburban constituencies. The
amounts available for facility expansion and equipment were increased,
and highway fund monies were made available for exclusive or preferential bus lanes and related uses. The 1973 highway act liberalized the use of
funds for bus-transit-related purposes. 34
Subsidizing the operation of expanded peak-period services was the one
remaining item on the downtown coalition agenda. When he presented
the Kennedy administration's transit proposal to Congress in 1963, Housing and Home Finance Administrator Robert Weaver was asked, "Do we
envision, after making a Federal investment at the capital end of the
structure ... making future Federal contributions in the form of subsidies
for the operation of these facilities?" Weaver responded, "We have never
advocated such subsidies, and we have no intention of doing so. " 35 Following passage of the 1964 legislation, though, Senator Harrison Williams,
the leading congressional champion of transit, introduced a bill calling for
operating subsidies, which failed. Once again, following the successful
passage of the 1970 transit bill, the coalition sought operating subsidies.
After a protracted campaign, in 1974 the Nixon administration decided
to adopt, as part of a rationalization strategy discussed below, a revenuesharing approach within which local agencies could choose to allocate
resources to capital or to operations and maintenance expenditures. 36 The
final piece of the downtown coalition program was now in place.

Rationalizing Federal Government Intervention
A key objective for national government executives has been to reduce
the threat to the treasury of long-term subsidizationY Several different
ways of achieving this object have been tried. They have included national mandates that metropolitan areas created region-wide government
agencies with the power to plan and to manage transport facilities. Research and development aimed at boosting productivity was sponsored as
well. When mandates to plan proved inattentive to efficiency concerns,
attention to these concerns was mandated. They waged ideological campaigns against expensive projects. Executive branch officials continually
sought ways to minimize the role of legislative politics in decisionmaking, in the face of constant efforts by congressional advocates to
champion the projects of their constituents. As the subsidy costs of the
transit program grew, executives sought to restructure the industry
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through privatization and other marketlike strategies primarily aimed at
strengthening management's capacity to reorganize the labor process and
to reduce the wage bill. The focus of rationalization efforts shifted over
time from increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of intervention in
the urban development process to reining in the fiscal-crisis machine that
had evolved.
Addressing downtown coalition transit proposals, Eisenhower administration executives called for comprehensive metropolitan land-use and
transportation planning that would determine the nature and level of
transit requirements and integrate transit and highway expenditures.
These suggestions echoed concerns voiced by leading urban planners
around the country following passage of the interstate highway program in
1956. In his 1960 congressional testimony on an early transit bill, Eisenhower's commissioner of urban renewal also stressed the absence of metropolitan governmental organizations that could finance and manage coordinated transport systems. These concerns, about governmental planning
and management capacity at the metropolitan level, and about the nature
and extent of subsidization, were present in the Kennedy administration
as wel1. 38
In 1961 the Kennedy administration supported increasing federal support for planning. Housing and Home Finance Administrator Robert
Weaver wrote to President Kennedy, and testified to Congress shortly
thereafter, that "unless cities prepare and adopt comprehensive community
plans, including mass transportation plans as an integral part thereof, they
may waste both their own and Federal funds and may aggravate rather than
correct problems of urban congestion, haphazard development, and deterioration. " Plans were intended to protect the value of investments that local
and federal governments were about to undertake. 39 Kennedy wrote to
Congress that his proposed legislation would -"stimulate urban areas to
establish areawide agencies empowered to plan, develop, and operate transportation systems."40 This was reinforced by the stipulation, contained in
the joint report of the Secretary of Commerce and the Housing and Home
Finance Administrator, that, after 1 July 1965, only those highway projects
that were consistent with areawide plans for a balanced transportation
system would be approved. Kennedy also said that an approved comprehensive plan and "the existence of a suitable organization representing all , or
substantially all, of the local governmental units in the metropolitan area"
were absolute requisites to federal subsidy.41 Weaver highlighted the central importance of this last point to the national executive: "It [subsidy] has
to go to some place where there is a central approach to the problem, or else
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we are going to dissipate our funds entirely and make chaos, rather than an
improvement. "42
The emphasis on planning, governmental organization, and need assessment in the early 1960s reflected the Democratic interest in party building and electoral support in central cities as well as a more general national executive interest in rationalizing the government's intervention in
the urban development process. The institutional innovations were aimed
at helping downtown activists achieve what they were ·unable to put in
place at the metropolitan level due to spatial competition-induced political conflict and state legislative opposition. At the same time, executives
placed the transit program in the context of increasing the efficiency of
other federal programs aimed at central city support, including freeway
building, urban and community renewal, and housing.
In his 1962 transportation message Kennedy discussed the essential
need "to conserve and enhance values in existing urban areas," and the
importance of promoting "economic efficiency and livability in areas of
future development. " He also noted that there was a need to intervene "to
assure more effective use of Federal funds available for other urban development and renewal programs. "43 Lyle Fitch, president of the Institute of
Public Administration, which did the research for the joint HHFACommerce study mentioned above, articulated this point clearly in his
1962 testimony to Congress: "In downtown areas the Federal Government is making very large investments for redevelopment and housing
and so from the point of view of preserving the Federal investment already
made and in prospect, it is highly important that we assist mass transportation."44 BUilding local capacity to plan and evaluate was critical because,
as Weaver told Congress, "This is a complex country, it is a heterogeneous country, and it is very difficult for us to get any staff in Washington
that is going to be able to make this evaluation in every community. It is
Our feeling very strongly that this has to be a matter of local responsibility .... And once you depart from this ... you are going to have a
situation where the Federal Government is going to be dipping into a
series of local situations, which is disastrous. "45
Echoing a comment made by Eisenhower's urban renewal chief,
Weaver also told Congress that the government lacked both theory and
data to discipline the nature and extent of federal subsidy: "I think ...
the biggest unexplored area-and one would assume there was a great
deal of knowledge, but there really isn't-is the effect of more prompt,
more satisfactory, more comfortable, more expeditious mass transit upon
the rider. . . . [I]f you increase the service and if you make it . .. a little
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more reasonable, is the ridership going to increase? Because if this is true,
then you have a whole set of economic possibilities. If it isn't true, then
you are in an entirely different situation. "46 Weaver was here articulating
an "economist" approach to policy analysis and intervention-a concern
with the elasticity of demand for transit-to go along with the traditional
government preference that in the case of infrastructure projects the userpay principle be applied to the greatest practical extent. Economist forms
of reasoning would become increasingly important in the executive
branch, especially after the institutional focus of the transit program
shifted from its origins in land use and urban development to transport
supply.
Interestingly, a little later in 1962 Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio, who
was sponsoring a competing piece of transit legislation that did not include federal grants, showcased the only available example of precisely
the sort of research that Weaver had described. Professor Leon Moses,
research director at Northwestern University's Transportation Center,
told a congressional committee about analyses that he was doing using
Chicago travel data. The research question Moses discussed with Congress was: "What price structure would serve to divert automobile users to
public transportation[?]" He noted that "no one else I know of has such
figures or has been interested in doing such a study, and yet this is the
essential criteria necessary for a bill to subsidize mass transit, if you are
going to subsidize it, and have some notion of what the costs are going to
be." He warned that "the experience in Chicago . . . proves it would be
extremely difficult to carry out diversion, and extremely expensive ....
[Tlhe cost of the program could exceed the cost of many other subsidy
programs we are now involved in. "47·
Congressional transit champion Harrison Williams mocked the caution
counseled by the economist approach. Specifically attacking Moses, Williams told Lausche's committee, "There was one witness in particular who
seemed agitated about the fact that we don't know with any scientific
exactitude how much it would cost to divert X number of riders from their
automobiles to their next best choice of public transportation. I just
wonder where this country would be today if we had to await answers to
similar questions about other problems facing the Nation. We would
certainly have a lot of busy and well-paid researchers tucked away in our
universities. . . . For the sad thing is that the question this witness
thought was in urgent need of answering is completely irrelevant to the
problem at hand." Williams cited evidence from the Boston area, and
from Philadelphia, where improvements in service had been associated
with increases in transit patronage to counter the claim that not enough
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was known about the dynamics of ridership. He also argued that the
comprehensive planning requirements in his proposed legislation "which
would determine the need, the value, the economic feasibility, and the
utility of any particular transit service-is the key to the wise and prudent
use of Federal funds." Williams agreed with Weaver that a metropolitanlevel planning capacity was essential because a national bureaucracy had
no business telling local people how to solve their problems. 48
The lack of interest in creating a substantial expert capacity at the
national level, or in getting a handle on likely future levels of subsidy
demand, reflected the congressional concern to advance the downtown
agenda as far and as quickly as possible. Comprehensive planning was an
arena within which to defend the interests of central business districts
within metropolitan areas, and both Congress and the executive branch
supported such an effort. However, suburban opposition to the recentralizing aims of such plans was increasing in intensity; it was a very
weak hook upon which to hang a strategy aimed at rationalizing the urban
development process.
The failure of authoritative metropolitan land-use planning agencies to
emerge increased the significance attached by downtown activists to transport facilities. In the absence of plans that would maintain historic patterns of land use, they looked to the new metropolitan-scale projects to
shape the dynamics of growth, so as to maintain the hegemony of the
central business district in the face of suburban business center competition. Ironically, just as the federal government was committing its resources to using transport investments to shape the pattern of future
metropolitan development, transportation planners engaged in plan preparation at the metropolitan level were concluding that it was essentially
too late to accomplish this. There was already so much transport capacity
in place that even the addition of a planned network of freeways and
transit lines would at best marginally influence the pattern of metropolitan land use. 49
The politics of transport planning in Washington, D. c., provided early
evidence of the obstacles confronting the planning strategy. A survey of
mass-transportation needs was mandated by Congress. The steering committee overseeing the preparation of this survey decided not to publish a
1959 report prepared by the Institute of Public Administration-the only
one of the support studies done for the mandated survey that was not
published-because they disagreed with the institute's proposal to create
a transportation organization embracing all modes of transport that would
be closely related to an effective regional planning agency. The institute's
report to the Secretary of Commerce and the Housing and Home Finance
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Administrator a few years later recommended that transit legislation contain a requirement for a regional planning process backed up by a regional
decision-making authority. These requirements were left vague in the
bills submitted to Congress. so
Congressional responsiveness to downtown concerns was the key element in the policy-making process. This prevented the establishment of a
framework conducive to an economically rational policy of transit industry adjustment. The executive branch was able to resist one particular
effort at obtaining subsidy, though: that of the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority to secure a federal guarantee of revenue bonds the
Authority wished to sell to finance construction of a downtown/radial rail
transit system. President Kennedy had referred in his transportation message to very specialized situations in which such a guarantee might be
appropriate. Senator Clair Engle of California told his colleagues that he
believed that "the language contained in the President's message-I
worked very closely with the staff people who wrote that message-was
placed in there because of the Los Ahgeles situation," and he sponsored a
bill that would create the possibility of such a federal guarantee. However,
largely based on Treasury Department opposition to a financing technique
that might interfere with its debt-management and long-term bondfinancing requirements, Engle's measure failed to pass. 51
Following the 1964 legislation, Congress added funds for research and
training, as well as money for planning, engineering, and designing transport projects. Whether operating increasingly decimated private firms or
continuing to operate the new governmentally owned transit systems, decades of retrenchment had produced a generation of transit managers who
were inexperienced in image-building, marketing, technological innovation, and other forms of entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, the industry's
poor financial prospects had held few attractions for a younger generation
of managerial activists. Congress also added funds for technologicallyoriented development. In the early 1970s, though, following several years
of increasing demand for downtown/radial rail rapid transit systems, the
executive faced, for the first time, applications for funds that would exceed
available monies. 52 The issue of prioritization posed a crucial test of the
executive's capacity to conduct a rational industrial policy as well as to
rationalize its own intervention.
Congress had closely questioned Robert Weaver about how the executive would establish priorities before the 1964 act. Weaver answered that
top priority would be given to those projects that were an integral part of
authoritative comprehensive plans. In addition, the government would
support local efforts to deal with an emergency situation in which an area
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was threatened with the imminent loss of transit service. 53 However,
serious questions regarding intervention choices did not arise during the
first few years following program start-up.
The question of allocation policy was complicated by the shift of the
transit subsidy program to the Department of Transportation in 1968.
The culture of Transportation disposed transit executives to the strict
economist approach to financing infrastructure that characterized the
department. Allocation policy was a highly controversial issue when
Transportation was created in 1966. The most controversy was generated
by a section in the original proposal for the department that would have
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to develop uniform standards
and criteria for evaluating all federal investments in proposed transport
projects. This clearly represented an effort to rationalize the transport
investment process; all projects would be subjected to a total systemsoriented cost-benefit analysis. Representatives of the many modal interests were extremely concerned about this proposed section, and, with
highway activists in the forefront, they persuaded Congress to restrict
dramatically the scope of authority granted to the executive branch.
While Congress determined to reserve for itself the lead role in project
decision-making, however, the department continued to stress greater
economic rationality in its varied interventions. 54 Grant Davis noted that
"the bills which have been submitted [to Congress] by the [Department of
Transportation] reflect its philosophical orientation which favors utilization of the market mechanism and the elimination of excessive subsidy.
Congress has not acted favorably to any of the recommendations by the
department to increase user charges and thereby insure that transportation users pay their 'fair share. ' Furthermore, when appearing before congressional committees, the organization is not held in high esteem. " 55
The departmental concern with rationalization was reinforced by toplevel appointments made by Nixon's Urban Mass Transportation Administrator in 1969. Most of these went to people with considerable managerial
experience in the defense and aerospace industries rather than, as had
been the case with the original federal transit program staff, to those with
backgrounds in land transportation, urban planning, and transportation
economics. A hardware orientation persisted within the agency, which
was closely linked to efforts to enhance productivity within the transit
industry. 56 In an industry where wage costs account for the great bulk of
operating expense, substituting capital for labor as a method of increasing
productivity had a great deal of surface economic appeal. Moreover, given
the extreme physical deterioration of the industry during its protracted
period of decline, new technology had marketing appeal as well. The
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savings theoretically available from the substitution of multicar trains
operated by one person for a multitude of buses each operated by a driver
was a major justification for the rail transit demands that were surfacing.
The large number of downtown alliances seeking subsidy for expensive
capital projects generated a great deal of budgetary anxiety. The White
House had fears about the capacity of national transit executives to develop and implement a method for rationalizing access to subsidies when
demand exceeded available grant funds. They were concerned that Congress would be irritated-and would intervene-when particular projects
failed to secure funding commitments. In September 1973 the Office of
Management and Budget instituted a moratorium on new projects involving railways and deleted all UMTA-requested money for rail projects in
fiscal year 1975. An ideological campaign against rail projects was waged
by the Department of Transportation and the UMTA administrator.
UMTA also instituted an elaborate set of project planning requirements,
including demands for cost-effectiveness analyses and the explicit inclusion of low-capital-cost approaches among the alternatives analyzed at the
metropolitan level. 57
Altshuler and Curry sympathized with the procedural demands elaborated by federal bureaucrats in their efforts to "avoid becoming caught in
the middle of local controversies, to limit demand for the scarce resources
at their disposal, and to require both statutory compliance with comprehensive planning requirements and the highest standards of professional
practice without appearing to impose their own values upon urban regions." Along with other transit industry activists and analysts, however,
they felt that form was now driving substance out of transportation planning; the quality of governmental decision-making was suffering as a
result of the emphasis on procedure,sB
While UMTA struggled to sort out the mushrooming number of rail
project proposals, the Nixon administration saw financial problems intensifying when the downtown coalition's demand for operating subsidies
gathered strength in the early 1970s. Academic analysts and national
transit executives forecast dire consequences if operations were subsidized.
They predicted that subsidies would be used inefficiently to expand services, and that the fares charged for additional services would be far below
the cost of their provision. In addition, they argued that transit workers
would win substantial pay increases because the subsidies would undermine managerial resolve to impose wage discipline on organized labor.'9
However, in the face of these plausible, articulate warnings, the administration was still forced to respond to the downtown demand to increase
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the most costly sort of service to provide-long-distance, peak-period
routes connecting downtown with low-density suburban areas.
The executives chose to do so by embedding a local choice to use
subsidy funds for either capital or operating expenses in a revenue-sharing
format. The White House wanted to reduce the discretion available to
executive branch officials because discretionary authority stimulated congressional efforts to influence its exercise. An approach that used formulas
to allocate funds, combined with local choice about spending, was intended to minimize congressional intervention in the subsidy allocation
process. If the executive could not rationalize its own allocation process,
then setting an overall limit and shrinking the executive's decisionmaking sphere appeared to the administration as an attractive strategy to
rationalize its own intervention. In the latter 1970s, though, Congress
continued to increase the amount of subsidy available, as well as intervene in the rail project approval process over which federal executives
still exercised discretion. 60
The evolution of local and federal programs of financial support,
adapted to the pressures of spatial competition at the metropolitan level,
exacerbated the financial troubles of the transit industry. The critics of
operating subsidies were right. The new services often carried relatively
light loads. At the same time, transit labor was able to secure wage gains
enabling them to keep pace with workers in other local government
sectors during a very inflationary period. Moreover, transit worker resistance limited management's ability to reintroduce work practices that
would soften the consequences of the continuing concentration of patronage in the peak hours, such as part-time labor and more split-shifts.
TranSit units also bitterly resisted efforts to contract out work to nonunion
firms. The result of these dynamics was a dramatic decline in industry
productivity. 61
The crisis was political as well as financial. Outlying business center
coalitions increasingly saw needs for locally-responsive transport going
unmet while downtown coalition projects absorbed ever more subsidy.
Many central business districts did so well strengthening their competitive
position-with freeways as well as transit-that few financial resources
remained to subsidize the transport-related growth aspirations of outlying
areas beginning to experience suburban gridlock. Public-sector transit
~risis has, in turn, generated a new round of efforts to restructure the
Industry and rationalize federal intervention, although the current situation is more complicated because of the presence of suburban business
center activists in local, state, and federal political arenas. As a result of
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international competition, subsidy possibilities are now more constrained
than during the 1960s and 1970s as well.

The Culture of Policy Discourse in Urban Transit
One of the more controversial reports prepared during the early legislative
debates was Technology and Urban Transportation, by John R. Meyer, John
F. Kain, and Martin Wohl. It was commissioned by the Panel on Civilian
Technology, which was set up under the joint sponsorship of the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Secretary of Commerce. The
report was presented in June 1962 and released-though neither published nor endorsed-in October. 62 Their charge was to identify areas for
useful research in urban transportation. The authors construed their mandate broadly, discoursing on the present and likely future course of metropolitan development and the resulting significance for transport requirements. They also did cost comparisons between different modes of urban
transit, reflected on the deep importance of social relations for a full
understanding of transport supply and demand, and addressed the equity
aspects of policy. The report exemplified the economist approach, stressing the need to evaluate the full costs of a proposed intervention through
a comprehensive, systemwide analysis, to find ways of using existing resources more efficiently, rather than simply to expand capacity whenever
bottlenecks appear, and to deploy a system of user charges to induce
efficient behavior. The authors challenged many of the arguments being
advanced on behalf of rail rapid transit projects. Within the industry,
which was familiar with its contents, the report and the critical commentary it sparked generated a "bus versus rail" controversy, but the issues it
raised went far beyond modal conflict.
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl called attention to the "underlying forces for
decentralization [which] would be operative independent of any public
policy influences since they are attributable to fundamental changes in
technology, income levels and consumer tastes . . . . [T]he availability
and use of transit does not seem to be a sufficient or a necessary condition
for creating density or downtown growth and, conversely, provides no
major retardant or preventive to the development of new employment
opportunities in the urban ring. "63 Following an analysis of the comparative bus and rail transit costs of supplying a hypothetical downtown corn'
muter trip, they argued that if the capacity of urban highways was effi'
ciently utilized during peak hours, as a result of the use of priority acceSS
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for transit vehicles and a set of charges for congested failures, foreseeable
levels of travel demand could be accommodated.
In addition to their concern with efficient capacity utilization, Meyer,
Kain, and Wohl also addressed the social and equity aspects of transit
policy. They hypothesized that declines in off-peak shopping transit trips
were related to the recent desegregation of buses in the South, and to a
desire for racial segregation elsewhere as well. They forecasted a bimodal
distribution of transit ridership; high-income executives, technicians and
their secretaries, on the one hand, and unskilled labor used in service
industries, on the other, mainly recruited from minority groups. They
noted "the tendency of people with high incomes to substitute long distance commuting for direct solutions to the problems created by restrictions placed upon minority housing opportunities," suggesting that "it
might be better to attack the housing segregation problem itself rather
than attempting to perpetuate it by subsidizing additional transportation
facilities for those whose travel demands are created by a search for segregation." In the absence of restrictions on minority housing choices, a
major resettlement of higher-income people closer to the central business
district-where many such people worked and would increasingly work in
the future-might occur, which, they believed, would greatly reduce, or
even eliminate, the commuting problem. 64
Technology and Urban Transportation was bitterly attacked by the Institute for Rapid Transit as "replete with fallacious theories and assumptions,
erroneous mathematical analyses, and prejudiced and undocumented conclusions." The institute, which was composed primarily of activist engineers working in transit operations, system design, and equipment manufacturing, was especially concerned about what it considered to be a
distorted and biased cost comparison between bus and rail transits. However, the institute, which had positioned itself as a leading member of the
downtown coalition seeking federal transit subsidy, also questioned
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's claim about the irreversible nature of the decentralizing forces: "The authors appear to be entirely blind to . . . downtown building booms [in New York and Chicago] and the national movement for strengthening and expanding central business districts. Surely
the private interests, as well as local and federal governments in many
instances, which are investing large sums of money in the downtown areas
of the nation's great cities, do not accept the author's contention that the
downtown area with its high concentration of population and activity is a
thing of the past. "65
Senator Harrison Williams also voiced his concern about Technology
and Urban Transportation. He worried that the authors were making a
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sweeping claim about what mode of transit was best for all metropolitan
areas, when it was certainly "not the job of the federal government or
others to tell a metropolitan area what modes of transportation it should
have." Williams also thought that "it might be better to await the results
from San Francisco before transit is consigned to the junk heap." The
senator doubted that the authors, "who were asked to identify useful
technological research areas, were fully qualified as observers of the social
and economic urban scene" to comment on racial segregation. He questioned whether their suggestion to attack the housing problem rather than
subsidizing transit "would also apply to future highway as well as transit
expenditures, and whether the authors would go so far as to say that the
problem of traffic congestion should be attacked by a program to get
people to live within walking distance of their place of work," the implications being that they would be unwilling to extend the logic of their
analysis in this manner, and in aQY case the latter notion was beyond the
pale. 66
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's claim about the immutability of the forces
producing decentralization-and that transit institutions and investments
should efficiently serve these underlying forces-was the most serious
challenge to planners, most of whom wanted to subordinate transport
projects to land-use plans aimed at strengthening central business districts. In contrast to the economist discourse embodied in Technology and
Urban Transportation, planners' discourse stressed a set of policy choices
premised on the malleability of the future pattern of urban development.
In a book based on the analytical work done for the joint CommerceHHFA study discussed earlier, Lyle Fitch and his Institute of Public Administration associates noted that "certain factors point to increased decentralization if past trends continue. But should they continue? Do we
want density or dispersion? Do we prefer urban areas with a single center
or with many functional nuclei? Should suburbs be integrated into the
urban region or be largely self-contained? How should they be related to
each other and to the central city? Do we want even development or
urban land or clusters leaving sections of open space? These are questions
which are unanswered in most developing urban areas and which vitally
concern transportation planning as well as urban design. "67
Fitch and associates set out both sides of the debate between those who
argued the "indispensability of the central city to our culture and economy"
and the decentralists, who emphasized "the inevitability or desirability of
dispersion of enterprises and population . .. throughout an urban region. "
They linked these positions on urban form to positions on transport supply,
characterizing Meyer, Kain, and Wohl as highway proponents who ques-
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tioned "whether grade-separated mass transportation has an important role
in the future urban complex," and who held that "planning should focus on
the widely decentralized type of city, which is made possible and best served
by the automobile. "68 At the national level, planning discourse focused on
the subordination of transport projects to comprehensive land-use plans,
leaving the resolution of the urban form debate to metropolitan planning
processes. Fitch and associates justified intervention to subsidize transit on
the basis that automotive transport in urban areas was subsidized, thereby
distorting supply-and-demand choices, concluding that "if for historical
reasons (good or bad), one mode of transportation is being subsidized by a
certain amount per passenger trip, competing modes should be subsidized
by at least roughly corresponding amounts per trip." Metropolitan planning
aimed at reaching consensus on urban form goals would then take place
without the distorting effects of unequal subsidy. 69
Economist Leon Moses clearly expressed the focus of planning discourse
at the local level as it contrasted with the economist emphasis on efficient
capacity utilization. When he discussed with Congress the economist
advice to increase the price of commuting by automobile as a way of
inducing efficient capacity utilization, he cautioned that "city planners ... whose real concern is not traffic congestion and the inefficient
use of highway capacity-viewed as a resource-but the economic future
of our mature, central cities, should pause before accepting it," because
instead of commuters shifting to transit in response to the price increase,
"there is a strong possibility that the core area's traffic problem will be
solved by reducing the number of people who work there."7o Working
within the context of spatial competition, local planners and political
leaders evaluated transport strategies from the perspective of their impacts
on particular places; the place competition dynamic was absent from
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's analysis of policy conflict. Spatial competition
would also prevent the emergence of consensus about metropolitan form
goals that Fitch hoped planning would produce.
As was the case with Leon Moses's testimony regarding the elasticity of
demand for transit, Technology and Urban Transportation played a minor
role in legislative debates. The report was referred to by a few others,
usually to support a critique of proposed legislation. The Investment
Bankers Association of America cited the report to support their claim
that "population growth in metropolitan areas has not been accompanied
by a corresponding increased need for urban mass transit facilities," and
that any transit subsidies should come from local governments rather than
the national treasury. 71 The American Road Builders' Association cited
the paper to support its view that while a great deal was uncertain regard-
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ing commuter transportation problems, there was no question regarding
the need for expressways; transit considerations, therefore, should not in
any way compromise the integrity of the highway program. 72 The Amalgamated A ssociation of Street, Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of America pointed to the report to illustrate its concern that the
federal government would be subsidizing automation. Meyer, Kain, and
Wohl had discussed the possibilities of automated buses operating in
special guidance lanes as a way of reducing labor costs, and automating
fare collection and vehicle loading and unloading. These sorts of technological changes, which, the union argued, would threaten the jobs and
the living standards of transit workers, required provisions that would
protect workers who were adversely affected. Analysts of the 1964 transit
act have all noted the critically important role played by organized labor
in the legislative success of the-bill. Reflecting the weight of organized
labor in Democratic party politics at the national and local levels, transit
unions were able to secure institutional guarantees aimed at ensuring that
their members would not bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of
industrial adjustment. Labor was thus positioned to seriously challenge
management efforts to restructure the work process. 73
Regarding the lessons to be learned from San Francisco, however,
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl's critique of the BART plan anticipated later
work critical of that system and of other rail transit ventures. 74 They
pointed out that a fixation on achieving very high average speeds on the
line-haul portions of the Bay Area system had led to poor station spacing
and location choices that would reduce access to potential patrons and
lengthen door-to-door travel times, thereby depressing patronage. Their
hypothesis of a link between racial segregation and rail transit investment
would be supported as well. The transit lobby's coordinator during the
1970 legislative campaign said, "The Southerners in Congress are quite
open about its being a white commuter program; Atlanta, for example, is
downright blunt about it . . . . [Tlhere is no question the realization by
politicians of who is going to benefit from the program-the middle and
the upper middle class-isn't an enormous tactical aid for us in working
with Congress, especially Republicans and Southerners. "75 The attributes
of an economically viable transit system that they set out-differentiated
services adapted to diverse consumer demands-became the objective of
Reagan administration executives in the 1980s.
Planner desires to use transport investments to shape the pattern of
metropolitan development and to strengthen the position of central business districts would continue to clash with economic admonitions that
such efforts were both utopian and elitist, and that services instead should
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efficiently serve expressed patterns of demand. 76 The planner's reliance
on the growth-shaping potential of transport, though, reflected an effort
to substitute transport projects for land-use plans. In the absence of plans
that would constrain the use of projects to create location advantages for
competing places, a great deal of growth-inducing transport capacity was
put in place. The planning ideal, articulated by one of the charter members of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, was to "plan our
cities so that the demand for transportation is not allowed to expand
without limit in the first place."77 Instead, competition to retain and
attract mobile capital rendered the planning ideal infeasible and overwhelmed economist efforts to rationalize the transit industry.
Senator Williams said to Institute for Rapid Transit president Walter
McCarter, "You and I and others of like mind are going to have to
preserve downtown commerce for the chamber of commerce." He phrased
it this way because the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed federal
intervention. "Of course," he continued, "in doing it, we will make
transportation available to the suburbanite who needs the city, wants the
city."78 During the 1960s and early 1970s the concerns of large urban
areas occupied a place near the top of the national agenda; downtown
coalitions were able to overcome resistance to intervention. The way
these coalitions shaped the transit industry adjustment policies that resulted generated fiscal and political crises. A rationalizing transit policy
would have led to a concentration of shrinking industry energies on those
services that could be most efficiently provided and the creation of new
industrial means to serve those markets that required different approaches. This would have included breaking apart large, difficult-tomanage transit organizations and dramatically altering labor policies. The
Outcome, however, was very different. During the latter 1970s national
executives attempted to discipline the subsidy allocation process through
planning mandates. The Reagan administration, which had little interest
in the big cities and in governmental intervention in domestic matters,
tried more direct approaches to rationalize intervention. These included
continuing efforts to eliminate, or at least to reduce, operating subsidies,
the use of performance standards to allocate resources, and support for
privatizing the very services that had been the heart of the downtown
coalition program. These strategies at the national level accompanied
suburban business center demands in many metropolitan areas to reorient
the services provided by regional transit agencies to facilitate their own
growth aspirations and to change institutional structures and finance
mechanisms if necessary to do SO.79 This much more complex, competi-
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tive metropolitan environment is the current context for efforts to once
again restructure the transit industry; the dynamics that characterized the
first phase, though, continue to influence policies of industrial adjustment.
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